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GEOGRAPHY, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT:  POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF FLORENCE FROM 13TH TO 15TH CENTURY
The purpose of this paper is to explain the link between geography, 
institutions and economic development by studying Florentine political eco-
nomy during the heydays of Florence from the late 13th to late 15th century. 
Geography plays an important role in economic development because it sets 
the starting positions for development of political, economic and cultural sy-
stems. Institutions and social capital are as important as geography for eco-
nomic development, so we could set the following formula for their interre-
lationship: geography + institutions + social capital = path dependence. By 
using historical and comparative methods we argue that geographical fea-
tures of Tuscany played an important role in the formation of its institutions, 
type of government and economy which enabled birth of the Renaissance, 
economic development and social mobility in the Florentine society. It is not 
by pure coincidence that today Tuscany is one of the most prosperous regions 
of Italy and Europe, as well. Geography infl uenced the building of medieval 
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cal and economic institutions of Florence were also conductive for economic 
growth and were made for the rule of merchants by the merchants. Far from 
being perfect these institutions enabled the birth of humanism, where indivi-
dual rights (property rights being the most important) were respected, with 
the emphasis on best interests of civic community. Implications for today are 
that those parts of Italy that had better civic tradition like Tuscany of Emilia-
Romagna have better local administration, better quality of life and higher 
economic growth.
Key words: geography, institutions, economic development, medieval 
Florence, regionalism.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explain the link between geography, institu-
tions and economic development by studying Florentine political economy during 
the heydays of Florentine state and economy from the late 13th to late 15th century. 
Geography obviously plays an important role in economic development (after all, 
Ricardo`s theory of comparative advantages is partially based on geographical 
features of land), because it sets the starting positions for the development of poli-
tical, economical and cultural systems. Institutions are as important as geography 
for economic development of a nation, both formal and informal rules by which 
the society governs itself. Geographical features of land such as mountains, sea 
access and climate infl uence the birth of social institutions so we could set the 
following formula: geography +institutions + social capital = path dependence. Of 
course the impact is not one-sided, but all of them mutually infl uence each other, 
as it will be explained in the paper. 
We have chosen Florence as our case study, because Florentine society and 
economy of this period allowed Florence to prosper and be the birth place of 
Renaissance. Social scientists, whether they are sociologists, historians, historians 
of art or political scientists have shown remarkable interest in the Florence and 
Florentines of the period from the 13th to 15th century. Now we think economists 
should research economy, political system and geographical features of the city 
that gave birth to Renaissance, especially the connections between geography and 
institutional systems that produce economic development or backwardness. We 
argue that geographical features of Tuscany played an important role in the forma-
tion of the Florentine political and economical systems that were in a way similar 
to that of the other Italian communes, but unique in its own right, because of the 
remarkable social mobility that was present in the Florentine society. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows: fi rst we will study the Florentine 
geography, political institutions, and its society. Later we will show the main theo-
ries of economic development based on the economic geography and institutional 
economics, and see whether we can explain the remarkable economic, political 
and cultural development of Florence by using these theories.  
2. Florence and Florentines 13th-15th century
2.1. The Florentine economy
Geography played a major role in the development of the Florentine eco-
nomy. The region around Florence is full of hills, which prevented wheat from 
being grown on a large scale, but which was ideally suited for planting vineyar-
ds, olive and lemon trees. Florence, if we are to believe the historian Giovanni 
Villani had around 100 000 inhabitants at the beginning of the fourteenth century. 
It was to be the absolute peak of the demographic expansion of Florence, because 
following the epidemic of Black Death in the 1348 it would take almost two cen-
turies for the city population to reach the level of the pre- plague years1. People 
could not have lived of the scarce wheat production that the Tuscan countryside 
provided, therefore a new economic niche had to be found in order for Florence 
to feed itself2. Lemon, wine and olive oil were among the fi rst Florentine products 
that were exported by its merchants. 
The societies, where there is more land suitable for agricultural production 
will probably develop certain form of a feudal society, because they will have 
the resources to build up a feudal society. Even the ancient Empires of Babylon, 
Egypt, China, and India though they emerged as despotisms did have a profound 
feudal structure. Florence simply did not have enough land to support the insti-
tutional framework of feudalism, while there was the abundance of land present, 
say, in the kingdom of Naples3. But the real future of Florentine economy lay in 
1 During the prosperous fi fteenth century the Florentine population reached 60 000 to 70 000 
inhabitants (Strathern,2005).
2 Giovanni Villani in his Nuova Cronica provides valuable insights here as well. Each day 
according to him the residents consumed over 2300 bushels of grain and drank in excess of 70,000 
quarts of wine. Some 4000 cattle and 100 000 sheep, goats and swine were slaughtered each year to 
provide the city with meat. See in Brucker, 1983, pp 51-52.
3 Which was as we will see the most important trading partner of the oligarchic Florentine 
commune. If there are mutual interests and potential gains from the trade, ideologies then as now 
do not prevent trade fl ows between countries that are governed by the different political-economic 
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banking. Florence was a relative latecomer to the banking world of the medieval 
period, since Florentine banks were founded in the thirteenth century, almost a cen-
tury later than the Lombard banks, and some fi fty years later then the banks in the 
neighbouring towns of Siena and Lucca. It seems to us that some sort of a primitive 
medieval banking cluster was born in Tuscany, which enabled Florentines to benefi t 
from technological spill-overs from the neighbouring Tuscan towns of Lucca and 
Siena. Florence not only managed to catch up with Siena and Lucca, but somewhere 
around the end of thirteenth century it managed to surpass them in its banking acti-
vity, and in the amount of capital deployed in its banks (Hunt, 1997).
The manufacturing of cloth was also a strong industry in medieval Florence. 
River Arno provided   necessary running water for the development of this indu-
stry. Woollen cloth industry employed 30% of Florence inhabitants, and it was a 
most important industry for sustaining the cities growing population4 (Brucker, 
1983, p. 52). Florentines were latecomers5 to wool manufacturing (Brucker, 1983, 
p. 54).6 Crucial to the development of it was the existence of the merchant banking 
companies, which were able to provide a necessary capital for starting the cloth 
business, import high quality wool from England and Spain7 and fi nally sell the fi -
nished cloth products abroad. Wool and cloth were to be the dominant “industries” 
of the Florentine state, together with the construction industry. 
The Florentine economy was dominated by its guilds that managed to secure 
a signifi cant proportion of political and economical power for themselves. There 
were seven great guilds in Florence, or the so called arti maggiori, and fourteen 
minor guilds, the so called arti minori. The most infl uential were Arti della Lana 
and Arti dell Cambio, the guilds of cloth producers and money-changers. Right to 
form a guild was given to certain professions, but the majority of skilled workers 
were not admitted to any of the guilds.
The Florentine state also tried to lead a mercantilist policy with erecting tariff 
barriers against cloth import in the later part of the fourteenth century (Hay, Law, 
systems (Today the relationship between USA and say Saudi Arabia is simillar to that of Florence 
and Naples).  
4 Although banking industry brought more profi t, it employed a relatively small number of 
Florentine labour- force, and it was often involved in the investment with the cloth industry.
5 Lombard towns and the towns in Flanders were doing it a hundred years before them.
6 It seems that medieval Florence and modern Asian countries like Japan, South Korea had 
similar paths to economic development, fi rst by entering industry and producing the cheap mer-
chandise, and later developing top quality products, which are able to command good prices in the 
world market. 
7 So effi cient were the Bardi in their wool importing business from England, that they man-
aged to control 80% of the English wool exports.  This was the cause of their great wealth, but also 
of their downfall, because in order to control English wool exports, they had to lend heavily to the 
kings of England, upon whom the whole business depended (Hunt, 1997).
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1989). When Florence conquered Pisa in 1409, the government tried to discoura-
ge the rival Pisan cloth industry. Many Pisan merchants chose to move to Venice 
and continued their activity there. But the most striking feature of the Florentine 
economy was the number of entrepreneurs that were recruited from the members 
of its merchant class. Members of the merchant class seldom became rentiers, and 
preferred the risky life of a merchant-banker. Sons of the noble merchant families 
became physicians and lawyers only if they were thought to be incompetent to 
become merchants. St Antonin, the Archbishop of Florence, was fearful for the 
future of his home city, if the merchant became the rentier. He condemned usury 
and the money speculation with these words: “The nobles who do not wish to 
work, in case they lack money they gradually consume, give it to a merchant 
or a money-changer, principally intending to receive something annually at their 
(the depostiee`s) discretion, the capital, being kept safe. And although they call 
it deposit, yet it is clearly usury” (Wood, 2002, p. 199). Maybe St Antonin was 
just expressing his fear that many of the formerly productive parts of the entre-
preneurial Florentine society were in this way becoming fi nancial speculators? 
He must have understood this, because he often praised the diligent merchants in 
his sermons, and was aware that the lack of entrepreneurial spirit might cause the 
decline of the Florentine economy.
Florence was the City of the medieval banking and fi nancial markets, and 
thus had a ready credit for it’s would be manufacturers and merchants. The typi-
cal Florentine banker also had its own manufactures, where he usually produced 
woolen cloth, and he was also an owner of the merchant company dealing with 
the export of Florentine manufactured goods and import of the raw materials and 
wheat. He also owned a villa in the contado, and raised crops of wheat, lemon 
and wine for the consumption of his own family (self suffi ciency in domestic 
consumption was the norm of the day among richer classes).         
The most important Florentine banks and bankers of the 14th century were 
the Bardi and the Peruzzi. These were the giant companies for that period and one 
of the reasons for the failure of these super companies was that they became too 
big to be managed by single person or indeed the single family. Not to mention 
that business cycle that lasted from 1250s to 1340s also coincided with the rise 
and decline of the Florentine super companies.  
The slow fi fty years decline and possibly a recession of the Florentine eco-
nomy started with the bankruptcy of the Bardi and Peruzzi super-companies in 
the early 1340is. This recession could possibly have been shorter and less painful 
were it not for the outbreak of the Black Death in 1348, which turn a recession in 
a depression. The recovery of the Florentine economy started with the new rise of 
the banking activity in the late 1300s, which is linked with the rise of the Medici 
bank. 
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2.2. Florentine political institutions
The main organ of Florentine political organisation was the Signoria. It com-
prised eight members, called priors, two from the each of the cities four districts, 
and the ninth member who served as a sort of president of Signoria and Florentine 
head of state called gonfaloniere of justice. In theory the gonfaloniere of justice 
was equal in power to his other eight colleagues, but tradition had made this po-
sition into the most prestigious and the most coveted position in the Florentine 
administration. The Signori held daily meetings in order to discuss the problems 
in its jurisdiction. The meetings were usually held in the Palazzo della Signoria. 
The Signoria had to consult duodici buonuomini and sedici gonafalonieri for eve-
ry major decision it wanted to make, also when it wanted to propose legislation to 
the Florentine assembly8. Signoria, duodici buonuomini and sedici gonafalonieri 
were known together as the tree maggiori. Tree maggiori represented the core of 
the decision making function of the Florentine government. There were a number 
of committees of permanent or semi-permanent nature(e.g. Dieci di Balia,  Otto 
di guardia, Consulte or Pratiche) that dealt with the specifi c aspects of admini-
stration. 
The interesting feature of Florentine political life was that the members of 
legislative bodies were elected by the Signoria. There were two bodies in Florence 
with legislative powers: the three hundred men strong Council of the People, and 
the Council of the Commune, which had two hundred members (they served for 
six months). The initiative for proposing legislation rested solely in the hands of 
tree maggiori organs of the Florentine administration. The legislative bodies had 
only the right to debate the proposals, and to approve or reject them. In order for 
the law or any other proposal to be accepted a qualifi ed 2/3 majority was asked. 
Brucker wrote that “these two bodies did constitute a check upon executive; 
they frequently rejected legislative proposals submitted to them by the Signoria 
(Brucker, 1983, p. 135). Furthermore Brucker concludes that “determined group 
of priors could usually persuade a recalcitrant assembly to approve a controver-
sial measure” (ibid, p. 135). But it is also true that any proposition for increasing 
tax levies, or new forced loans were most likely to be rejected by the councils. 
Florentines liked their city, but it seems that they had liked their money more, and 
they did not want to pay more then what they thought was their fair share of the 
tax burden.
The main principle for staffi ng the various organs of the government was 
the principle of distrust. Florentines had a bit of the problem since a lot of their 
patricians, middle class merchants, bankers and lawyers had a signifi cant amount 
8 In this case Signoria had mandatory obligation to seek counsel from these two bodies.
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of economic power, and they wanted a corresponding political power in order to 
guard their economic and political interests. So a way had to be found in which a 
large number of men could hold political offi ces9, but not for the very long time. 
Offi cers of the State served for a period from two to six months. (Hale, 2004, 
p.15). Considering also semi-permanent institutions 3000 men were given chan-
ce to rule the city every year. Members of the Chancery were the only that were 
regarded as permanent civil servants10. This enabled preservation of balance of 
power and gave an opportunity to the cities brightest and best educated people to 
partake in the running of the city. 
The election system of Florentine Republic was a fairly democratic one, and 
at least in the beginning offered a chance for advancement to the luckiest eligible 
members of Florentine “good society”. The names of candidates for public offi ce 
were put in a bag and were drawn from it. In order to be eligible for the tree mag-
giori, a candidate had to meet certain requirements.11 No man could hope to be 
elected as a member of Signoria if he had served in it less than three years before, 
or if any member of his family had served within one year. In this way Florentines 
at least tried to prevent one family from gaining the dominance over the Signoria 
and the running of the city. Openly it was impossible for one noble family to rule 
the city, but they could always form a party and lead from the shadows.
Democracy is good for economic growth though we often forget that demo-
cracy is closely correlated with the redistribution of wealth in a society. Florence 
prided itself on its democracy and its democratic institutions. To prevent the weal-
th to be redistributed Florence limited the voting rights, and the eligibility for hol-
ding offi ce, and thus had a representative government, and not a democratic one. 
If we analyze Florence using Olson`s method we could say that Florentine politics 
were almost on verge of becoming democratic, since 10% out of its 90 000 inha-
bitants had some degree of political rights12 provided that they were males, and 
that they had paid their taxes. This right was limited only to citizens of Florence, 
while other towns that were under Florentine rule were granted a degree of au-
tonomy, and had to pay taxes and provide troops for the Florentine state. In our 
opinion the key year for the establishment of the Florentine political system was 
9 Women were as was normal for the period not permitted to hold public offi ce.
10 Niccolo Machiavelli was to achieve fame and eventually to write his masterpiece “Il Princ-
ipe“, based on his experiences as a civil servant.
11 He could not be bankrupt or in arrears with his taxes; he had to be over thirty years old; 
he had to be enrolled in one of the seven arti maggiori or major guild, or one of the fourteen minor 
guilds (Hale, 2004, p.17).
12 Nothing like this would be seen until Polish Commonwealth came into being in the 16th 
century. In this Republic all the male nobles had voting and vetoing powers, providing a degree of 
political anarchy unsurpassed in history of modern states in Europe. Indeed in England voting rights 
that were equivalent to Florentine would not be seen until the turn of the 19th century. 
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1385, when the ciompi revolt ended, and the government of the merchants (and 
for the merchants) was established. Being oligarchic in nature and dominated by 
the powerful merchant family lead by the Albizzi, it nonetheless had as we have 
seen certain democratic elements (large number of voters etc). 
To govern Florence, relatively large and often unstable coalitions had to be 
formed. The success of Medici take-over of the Florentine state in 1434 was ba-
sed on their wealth but also on their ability to form alliances with other powerful 
Florentine patrician families, such as Strozzi, Bardi, and Neri. The ruling oligar-
chy was always wary of its own interests, and the Medici though being by far the 
richest family in Florence could not match the combined political and economic 
power of the other patrician families. So the Medici had to rule as fi rst among 
equals, and had to observe the Republican constitution and form. In 1533 the citi-
zens of Florence rose one last time against what had become the Medici tyranny, 
but with the help of the armies of the Emperor Charles V the rebellion was cru-
shed. In 1534 the Medici were fi nally established as the hereditary and absolute 
rulers of Florence. Now there was only one legitimate party, the Medici party, and 
the only socio-economic interests that counted were of that party. No wonder that 
the slow and painful economic and cultural decline began.
2.3. The Florentine legal system
Legal systems of oligarchic Florence was far superior to legal systems in say 
rival and anarchic Naples. Why was it so? First of all in Florence Roman law as the 
predominant form for trade contracts was slowly but steadily replaced by lex mer-
cantoria, the so called merchant law that was far better suited for the regulation of 
trade. Cotrugli thought that good merchants should resolve their disputes outside of 
the civil courts that were usually using the Roman law (Kotruljević, 2005). The civil 
procedure was far more costly both in resources needed and in the waste of time. 
In Florence tribunal Sei dei mercanzia was resolving disputes by using lex mercan-
toria, and thus signifi cantly lowering the transaction costs of the concerned parties. 
Long term investments were not possible, if citizens feared that their property would 
be confi scated, or if there was no impartial third party that could secure the imple-
mentation of contracts. Florentine judicial system was quite effective and just by 
the standards of the time, and lex mercantoria was used. Florence usually respected 
the property rights of her citizens, especially after the introduction of the catasto 
tax system in 1427 instead of the manipulative estimo system. Sometimes there 
were exceptions to these rules, since men, who were seen as the threat to the regime 
had their property confi scated. Florentine state always prided itself on its currency 
the golden fl orin. Florin was always made of the same amount of gold. Florence 
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never caused infl ation by lowering the amount of gold in the fl orin, so infl ationary 
pressures were either supply induced (if there was a rise in prices of imported raw 
materials, or grain), or on the demand side (when population became too large and 
problems in food supply appeared). And public debt or monte was usually paid and 
not repudiated. No wonder then that investments were made not only in business 
sector of economy (secure property and contract rights), but also in building up the 
palaces (property rights), which along with its churches are a continuous remainder 
of the Florentine affl uence and confi dence in 15th century.
It is important to mention here that lex mercantoria was used by regular 
Florentine courts, while in the rest of Europe with the possible exception of some 
other Italian, Catalan or Provencal commune, it was used by the special arbitrary 
courts of merchants, and not by courts of the state13. North has praised the advan-
tages of order for economic growth (North, 2003). Throw in stable hierarchies of 
merchants that Braudel claim are necessary for economic development14 and you 
get Florence of the 14th and 15th century. 
2.4. The Florentine tax and monetary system
The prevailing method for basement of one`s tax obligation to the 1427 was 
the estimo system. In this system individual`s tax obligation was based on the 
estimate of individual’s wealth by a select committee of his neighbours (Brucker, 
1983, p. 143). While his neighbours were the most knowledgeable about his eco-
nomic status, they could be very partial in their estimates as well. Florentines were 
very unusual by Italian standards of any age, because they actually accepted the 
necessary evil of paying taxes and principle that each citizen should bear the tax 
burden according to his ability. After the sum of money that Florentine owed to 
the state was established, he could try to ask tax relief from magistracies and le-
gislative councils15. But Florentines nevertheless tried to win sympathy from their 
fi scal authorities painting the worst possible picture of the effect that the tax paid 
will have on their lives, or they were trying to convince fi scal authorities that they 
simply did not have the means to pay their taxes16. 
13 Merchant law would slowly be recognised as part of the „offi cial“state judiciary system 
from the sixteenth century onwards, and this practice would have its peak in Napoleon`s famous 
„Code Commerce“in 1804.
14 See more in Braudel, Fernand:Igra razmjene.  pp. 421-450.
15 The fi scal authorities were never known for their generosity in granting the tax relives. As 
Alexander Hamilton used to say „Only two things are certain in life: death and taxes“. 
16 Pawn broker Barone di Cose used these words to describe his situation “This Barone pos-
sesses nothing in this world save his own body, his wife and three small children (one having died 
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This unjust system of taxation brought so much civil disobedience that it had 
to be removed and replaced by the catasto system in 1427. The catasto system 
was seen as many historians17 as being the most rational and equitable tax system 
then existing in Europe. Each taxpayer was obliged to furnish the fi scal authorities 
with a complete catalogue of his real and personal property and his obligations 
(Brucker, 1983). On the basis of these, his assessment was calculated. The rate of 
assessment was fi xed one-half of one percent of the capital, less deduction, and 
this infl exible schedule favoured the wealthy, because the system was proportio-
nal. The fi scal offi cials still had wide discretion in calculating the levies of the 
poorer citizens and in negotiating settlements with delinquents, so that personal 
infl uence continued to be factor in the allocation of the tax burden (ibid, p. 146). 
The catasto system did not solve all the existing problems of the Florentine fi nan-
ce (reducing the total amount of the tax burden), and it certainly did not alter the 
heavy reliance of the state fi nances on the forced loans.
Florence did not often have balanced budget, so in order to fi nance its public 
debt the Commune started to levy forced loans or the prestanze on its citizens. The 
prestanze were commuted into shares of the funded debt the so called Monte, whi-
ch paid small but regular interest. Almost all the patrician families of the fi fteenth 
century owned Monte shares. The Florentine public debt rose greatly between 
1345 and 1420s, largely as a consequence of wars of expansion and defence (Hay; 
Law, 1989). Florentines liked prestanze as a sort of a secure investment. And it 
was also possible for the poor to invest their meagre savings into the Monte sha-
res. Hay and Law think that the extremist among the Florentine ciompi lost the 
popular support because of their threat to the public debt and the interest payments 
(ibid, 1989, p. 101). In an attempt to fi nd more permanent and manageable source 
of fi nance, the Florentine commune instituted also the Monte delle Doti, or the 
Dowry Fund in 1425 (ibid, p. 105). 
The main sources of the fi scal revenue for the Florentine state were indirect 
taxation and the prestanze fi nancing of its public debt. In 1495 when the exi-
stence of the Republic was in danger, the state introduced a direct taxation. The 
government of Florence could borrow and raise loans with rather low interest 
rates, because the Republic was perceived to be good debtor. Interest rates to 
say Neapolitan Crown were usually very high, almost prohibitive, since capital 
always likes the order in the place, where it is being invested, and if there is 
disorder, or a sort of autocratic government it will ask for higher rates of return. 
The Florentine monetary system was a source of pride for the Florentine state. 
Florence was minting silver grossi or the so called fi orini d` argento by the 1237, 
in prison) and he (Barone) is dying of hunger in jail, while his family starves outside”  (In Brucker, 
1983, p.143).
17 Burckhardt and Brucker were among them.
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but the gold standard was already winning the battle between the gold and silver. 
In 1252 Florence began to mint its gold fl orin18, which weighted 3,5 grams. It was 
to become the proto-type of almost all the gold coins in the fourteenth century 
Europe. The main reason for minting the gold fl orin was the fact that the Florentine 
economy was expanding so the silver grossi were no longer enough to support the 
expanded economic activity19. The second reason was that the trade with distant 
places such as Northern Europe was demanding gold coins, which were far dearer 
to the northern businessmen than the usual silver money. The third reason was that 
the Byzantine nomisma, the supreme ruler of the gold coinage around the world 
for more than 800 years was slowly losing its value and the world needed a stable 
currency in order for the “foreign” trade to function easily. According to Villains’ 
chronicle Florence was minting between 350 000 and 400 000 fl orins every year20 
in the 1330s. During that century, fl orin managed to expand into Western Europe 
and became the dollar of the Western Mediterranean trade. Everyone wanted to 
posses it, or to mint imitations of it. And the forgers of the fl orin were severely 
punished. Even Dante reserved a special place for them in the deepest part of the 
eight circle of hell21.
2.5.  Florentine foreign relations and their importance for economic 
development
Since Florence lacked a good access to the sea, its sea access depended on 
good relations with its more powerful neighbour Pisa. The two towns were more 
often at war than at peace, which resulted in Florentine conquest of Pisa in 1409. 
Florence was also near but not on the sight of the major trade routes connecting 
the North of Europe with the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily and with Rome. The 
precondition for having a chance of sustained economic development and growth 
lay in Florence’s ability to have good political relations with Papacy and with 
whoever was holding power in Naples. Crucial for establishing good relations 
with Papacy and Naples was Florentine decision to join the ghibelin party lead by 
the Pope in the struggle for supremacy in Western Europe against the Holy Roman 
18 The Cambridge Economic History of Europe: Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages/ ed-
ited by Postan, M.M. and Miller, Edward, p. 829.
19 Somehow the fact that the Florentine super companies such as those of Bardi and Peruzzi 
appeared a couple of decades after the introduction of fl orin, can not be dismissed easily as the sign 
of the expanding Florentine economy.
20 The Cambridge Economic History of Europe: Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages/ ed-
ited by Postan, M.M and Miller, Edward page 832.
21 See more in Alighieri, Dante: La Divina Commedia, pp. 193-194.
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Emperor. By backing the Pope and helping to provide the funds for the Angevine 
conquest of Naples, Florence managed to establish valuable trading, and political 
ties with these two powers. 
In the beginning, the good relations with the Angevins of Naples were more 
important. We can actually see that the rise of Florentine economy and the decline of 
Neapolitan economy could be traced back to the end of the thirteenth century, when 
newly established Angevine kings of Naples tended to favour foreign merchants, 
especially those of Florence22 over domestic merchants who were thought to be 
loyal to the old regime of Hohenstaufen. The kingdom of Naples can be viewed as a 
land of opportunity for Florentine merchant companies that were buying grain in it 
and exporting the cloth to it. Later, the relations with the Papacy became absolutely 
vital for the development of Florentine banking, because to be named an offi cial 
banker of the Pope meant to be able to collect funds for the Holy See from around 
the known Christian world. The Medici bank was trying frantically to be named 
offi cial bankers of the Papacy, because it was the most lucrative banking position in 
the whole of Christendom. So successful were Medici in their bid that they managed 
to have two family members elected as Pope (Leo X and Clement VII).
2.6. The Social structure of Florentine society
Florence’s social and political structure was also conducive to economic de-
velopment, thanks to a remarkable degree of openness and opportunity of social 
advancement. The structure of the Florentine society was more or less the same 
as in most Italian cities at that time. Its highest rank was held by patricians or the 
so-called popolo grasso – wealthy bankers, lawyers, merchants and cloth manu-
facturers, or practitioners of the arti maggiori.
The next sub – class was the so-called popolo minuto23, or small people, 
which consisted of small craftsmen, local merchants and artisans – all those who 
practiced the so-called arti minori. They had the right to form guilds, and through 
them they also had some infl uence on the governance of the city. The lowest class, 
were the ciompi, or menial workers at the manufactures which had no political 
rights and were despised by the well-off Florentines. Florence never had a closed 
caste social structure; skilled and capable men had the opportunity to climb the 
22 They after all provided funding for the Charles of Anjou conquest of Naples.
23 It is interesting to note here that there was also a physical difference between the popolo 
grasso and popolo minuto. Because they could afford to eat more meat, the patricians were taller 
than their common compatriots, but because of this meat diet were also prone to die in great pain of 
the gout disease.  
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social ladder and become patricians: there was nothing that money couldn’t buy. 
After all, both the Peruzzi and the Medici were members of the popolo minuto be-
fore they rose to wealth and power, therefore they were typical examples of social 
climbers. Florentine society offered a lot of opportunities for ambitious men and 
families. Florentine dream and American dream are not that dissimilar. We know 
that in Florence as it was the case of the 19th and early 20th century USA, fi rst ge-
neration of entrepreneurs got rich and then the second or the third generation en-
ters politics. No wonder that such system of opportunity for the best and brightest 
resulted in a fl ourishing economy and a splendid hotbed of the Renaissance. 
3. Geography and economic development 
3.1. Theoretical views
Geography plays an important role in the process of economic development. 
It determines the economic development of a region, and few regions and states 
were fortunate enough to escape the development pattern of nature that surrounds 
them. Geography is the real space, where humans interact. It represents human 
habitat like towns, villages, mountains, plains, rivers, sea, raw materials. We shall 
treat geography as endogenous variable in our model of economic development. 
Transportation costs are of great importance in international economics (Krugman, 
Obstfeld, 2003), therefore geographical location can potentially promote or pre-
vent economic development.    
Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup summarised the seven types of hypotheses that 
various philosophers, historians and social scientist offer as a suggestion for the 
correlation between geography and economic development24:
Early philosophers, such as Montesquieu, surmised that climate might have 
direct effects on temperament, work effort and social harmony. Many writers, 
activists, and politicians have argued that link from geography to development 
is link from race to development. Some philosophers and social scientists have 
linked geography and climate to the form of government, Wittfogel (1957) claims 
that riparian civilizations are prone to despotism because of centralized control of 
water system and the large public works that support irrigation. Some social scien-
tists have argued that climate helps to determine the means of production-yeoman 
24 Mellinger, Andrew D., Sachs, Jeffry D. And Gallup, John L: Climate, Costal Proximity, 
and Development in Clark, Gordon L., Feldman, Maryann P. And Gertler, Meric S. edited by: The 
Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography, 2000, pp. 172-173.
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farming in the temperate regions, plantation agriculture in the tropics-and there-
fore the organisation of society and propensity to economic development. Many 
scientists have argued that geographical correlations are accidental refl ections of 
historical events: the temperate zone societies succeed, in some sense accidental-
ly, in dominating tropical societies through military conquest and colonial rule. 
Another approach argues that geography is important because geographical en-
dowments (climate, access to navigable waters) directly affect productivity, throu-
gh transport costs, health and disease, nutrition, population density, and so forth. 
A fi nal approach argues that ecological and geographical conditions were once 
very important, but are no longer so important because of technological progress. 
Geographical correlations with economic development would therefore refl ect the 
past relationships plus the continuing path dependence of history (early forces, no 
longer operating, continue to affect present conditions).
3.2. Italy and its geographical features
Italy was the most developed part of the Mediterranean world throughout 
the medieval time. It lies in the very centre of the Mediterranean, and was ideally 
suited to play the middleman`s role in the trade between Middle East and Western 
Europe. During the Roman times Italy was a centre of a world Empire that had 
all of the Mediterranean under its rule. Roman businessmen constituted a spe-
cial social class of knights (eques) within the Empire. By building the harbour of 
Ostia, Roman Emperors gave new trading impulses to their subjects. When the 
Barbarians overran the Western Roman Empire a certain amount of these busines-
smen found shelters in the remaining Roman towns like Milano, Rome, Naples, 
or they managed to establish new towns such as Venice. Majority of these towns 
would become self-governing communes in the middle ages. A bit of the Roman 
entrepreneurial spirit might have been saved in these towns, falling asleep and 
waking up when the time was right. 
Though it is politically incorrect now to agree with Montesquieu that climate 
might have some infl uence on temperament, work effort, and social harmony, it is 
hard to ignore it. Italy is roughly divided into two climate areas, the Northern part 
has more rain, while the Southern part, usually called Il Mezzogiorno or „land of 
the noon“, has very little rainfall25. Southern Italians defi nitely had to adapt their 
working rhythms to the fact that it is virtually impossible to work the fi elds from 
11 am to 17 pm26. 
25 See more in Landes, David S.: Bogatstvo i siromaštvo naroda, 2003, p. 320.
26 The same thing applies to region of Dalmatia in Croatia.
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Italy’s geographical position enabled easy development of agricultural plants 
and domestication of animals. Italy also avoided the tropical diseases, except for 
malaria that was to be found in the river Po region, and in swamp regions of Italy. 
Sea access gave Italy the benefi ts of the cheapest means of transportation that 
more than compensated for the problems of land transport. Land transport would 
eventually evolve through time and it would become reliable and cheap. Tuscan 
hills in the case of Florence did not offer enough place to start agricultural pro-
duction that would feed its population. Florence would always be dependent on 
the imports of food from Naples. Since agricultural self-suffi ciency and feudalism 
go hand in hand, it is no wonder that a different sort of society and economy was 
born in Florence and Venice. Capitalism needs trade to act as its midwife. Feudal 
institutions, such as chivalry never existed in Florence. Here the land was not 
the source of power, because there was no land to organise a suffi ciently large 
food production. Lack of food forced Florentines to develop alternative means 
by which to acquire food. They had to fi nd a way to produce other goods in order 
to exchange them for food. Florence saw its opportunity in cloth manufacturing. 
We argue here that its geographical location and the before mentioned lack of 
fertile farmland prevented feudalism from becoming the dominant system of po-
litical economy in Tuscany, and as the direct consequence of that an oligarchic 
commune was to be the dominant political system of Florence, while in economy 
we argue that there existed a proto-capitalism at least since the middle of 14th 
century.  Florence lead wars of expansion primarily to secure a sea access, which 
it fi nally achieved with the conquest of its arch-rival Pisa in 1409, and to destroy 
its potential trade rivals like Siena. Sea access was crucial in the development of 
Florence and Florence sent its own galleys to trade in Alexandria in 1420is. This 
is a remarkable achievement, one that shows that Florentines were thoroughly 
conscious of the importance of sea transport, and were also aware of the fact that if 
they had to pay for the transport of goods by the sea to their potential commercial 
rivals such as Venice, Genoa or Catalans, they were making them rich, and were 
dependent on their good graces. Therefore they were tying their hands in the con-
duct of foreign policy, because they would always have to be on friendly footing 
with the naval republics, while the possession of their own fl eet allowed them 
to explore a whole new world of possibilities in the conduct of their mercantile 
foreign policy. 
Political fragmentation of Europe and of Italy was also the result of geo-
graphy, and lack of natural, and easily defensible borders. Western Europe was 
never ruled by a single king. This political and geographical fragmentation was 
according to Landes27 key to European and Italian success. Italy was made of 
27 See more in Landes, David. S.: Bogatstvo i siromaštvo naroda, 2003,  pp. 90-92.
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many small states28 that were keeping a jealous guard on their independence. 
Whatever innovation in economy and especially in military technology appeared 
in one state, was immediately imitated by its neighbours that were worried by the 
fact that they might fall behind. The rivalry between Genoa and Venice produced 
many new innovations in ship design, and naval warfare. There was great mobility 
of Italians of this time, who were moving from one place to another, not only in 
Italy, but through the world. Many factors played part in these decisions, from the 
love of profi t to self imposed exile of certain merchant groups. Florentine super-
companies had their agents in all the major places in Europe of that time. Profi t 
motive was a strong one for migration, and Italian (Florentine) merchants were 
often following it29. Since Renaissance time individualism was on the move30, 
Renaissance artists like Michelangelo and Leonardo da Vinci were often working 
outside their native towns. Their examples would be followed by many less well 
known artisans and merchants, not to mention frequent migration from the conta-
do to the town in the prosperous years, and the reverse migration from the town 
to contado in times of economic crisis. Northern Italian peasants became mobile 
three hundred years before their English counterparts. 
4. Institutions and economic development
4.1.  Institutions
We can introduce another endogenous variable to our model of economic de-
velopment: institutions. What are institutions? What kind of impact do these my-
sterious rules of behaviour have on economic development? According to North, 
institutions are “rules of behaviour that structure human relationships: one man’s 
opportunity is another man’s constraint” (North, 2003, p. 13). Institutions lower 
the uncertainty by providing the structure for the everyday life be it social, econo-
mic or religious. There are formal institutions such as law code, or constitutions, 
and informal ones like customs. Their impact on economic life is an important 
one. The institutional framework evolves through a lengthy periods of time, and 
cannot be changed in a heartbeat. Many things have infl uence on it. As we have 
28 Metternich said: Italy is geographical and not political term.
29 Political motifs may have played their part too. Pisan merchants preferred to emigrate to 
Venice than to continue doing business under the rule of their ancient enemy Florence. Same thing 
happened in thirteenth century Lucca, when many merchants decided to leave the city that was ruled 
by the „tyrant“ Castrucci, and instead settled in Florence, and Venice, where they helped to establish 
silk industries (Luzzatto, 1960)
30 See more on this in Barzun, Jaques: Od osvita do dekadencije, 2003.
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seen geography can infl uence the institutional framework easily and strongly. We 
can ask ourselves how comes that feudalism prevailed in the societies, which had 
land suitable for the agricultural production, while capitalism emerged and thri-
ved in the societies where agricultural production was not very developed31? The 
source of power in feudalism was land, so the societies, where there is more land 
suitable for agricultural production will develop certain form of feudal society, 
because they will have the resources to build up feudal society. 
Political, economic and cultural institutions represent three different systems 
that infl uence each other: politics, economics and culture. We can try and imagine 
that these institutions form a sort of triangle, where all three of them infl uence 
each other (Figure 1).
The process of interaction between various institutional systems is a com-
plicated one. The most common path of institutional change would be that it fi rst 
occurs in either cultural or economical institutions and is then adopted by political 
institutions (a sort of bottom-up institutional change). Institutional change can be 
introduced to economic and cultural institutions by using the power of political in-
stitutions (a sort of top-down institutional change). In order for institutional chan-
ges to occur, time is needed for humans to adapt their behaviour to new rules. 








INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS.
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Two key areas of study for New Institutional Economics are transaction costs 
and institutional change. “High information price is a key for transaction costs, 
which are made out of cost of establishing the value of the things traded, costs of 
protecting property rights and establishing order and implementing contractual 
rights” (North, 2003, p. 44). If the institutions that lower the transaction costs are 
effi cient, economic growth will be higher. The rediscovery and use of Roman law 
in eleventh and twelfth century served well in lowering the transaction costs, but 
more fl exible lex mercantoria was gradually developing. When Roman law star-
ted to increase transaction costs it went out of use in Florence and lex mercantoria 
became the dominant legal system for trade. 
North claims that the two main sources of institutional change are demo-
graphic changes and changes in relative prices (North, 2003, p.115). In these cases 
price mechanism is dictating the changes in institutional setting. In our opinion 
price mechanism is not the only mover of institutional change, and the sources of 
institutional changes can be external32, or internal. External infl uences on institu-
tional change could be seen in the change of prices of land and labour following 
the Black Death, while endogenous institutional change will be the result of eco-
nomic and political process by which different interest groups will try to establish 
institutional framework benefi cial to their needs. In our opinion North is correct 
when he states that the prevailing institutional structure will not be the one that 
is the most effi cient, but the one that is best suited to the interest of the dominant 
interest groups in the society (North, 2003). Reality-beliefs-institutions would be 
the genuine genetic code of emergence and change of institutions. When reality 
or our beliefs change, there will be institutional changes that will refl ect the new 
beliefs.    
4.2.  Political economy of development: autocracy vs. democracy
Human societies began as anarchies, later autocracy was established, and 
from autocracy democracy somehow managed to emerge. Diamond in his book 
“Guns, Germs and Steel” offers a simple demographic explanation of the emer-
gence of state. When tribes become too big, an impartial third is needed to provide 
order and give society a sense of direction.  Small societies can function quite well 
32 The best example of the external shocks that cause changes in institutional structure can be 
shown in the case of Russia. The military defeat in Crimean war in 1856 forced the regime to abolish 
serfdom and introduce some sort of capitalism. Then the defeat in World War I forced the transition 
from capitalism to communism, while the defeat in the cold war and the defeat of the economic 
system itself prompted the return to capitalism.
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without formal political organization like state. In small society, where everyone 
knows everyone else it is easy to resolve confl icts by using personal method. 
When number of population increases the intimacy of the small population is lost 
and there arises a need for the impartial third e.g. the state to resolve the confl icts 
between the members of the society. Sedentary agricultural societies increased 
their population and developed sophisticated states hundreds of years before the 
nomad societies. We can see that this is in line with North`s argument, because he 
mentions changes in demography, as one of the three main sources of institutional 
change.
Order in North`s words is “a necessary (but not suffi cient) condition for the 
long term economic growth. It is equally necessary (but not suffi cient) condition 
for establishment and maintenance of the variety of conditions underlying the 
freedom of person and property that we associate with consensual or democratic 
society” (North, 2005, p. 104). Anarchy is not good for the economic growth 
because a lot of resources have to be invested in the protection from the external 
threat of the other individuals or groups, and the division of labour and speciali-
zation thus provided, cannot be used to their uttermost, if all the individuals have 
to protect their “property”. So some sort of order must be established be it an au-
tocratic kind of order or democratic one. North argues that both systems of order 
ideally have the following characteristics:
An institutional matrix that produces a set of organizations and establishes a 
set of rights and privileges;
A stable structure of exchange relationship in both political and economical 
markets;
An underlying structure that credibly commits the state to be set of political 
rules and enforcement that protects organizations and exchange relationships;
Conformity as a result of some sort of a mixture of norm internalization and 
coercive enforcement (ibid, p. 105).
Olson measured the economic effi ciency of autocracy vs. democracy by 
taking into account how these two systems of government can provide for the 
recognition and protection of property rights, the implementation of contracts, and 
giving us the stable currency without infl ation. Economy will generate its maxi-
mum income only if there is high rate of investment. Much of the return on long-
term investments is received long after the investments are made. In autocracy the 
autocrat, who is trying to have a long term view, will try to convince his subjects 
that their capital will be permanently protected not only from theft by the others 
but from confi scations by the autocrat himself. If his subjects fear expropriation, 
they will invest less, and in the long run his tax collections will be reduced (ibid, p. 
25). If autocrats are not respecting the property rights of their subjects, instead of 
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investment there will be hoarding, and hiding of the money33. The basic question 
for the autocrat is to set the tax rate that would allow him to gather enough inco-
me to indulge his tastes for princely consumption, and to keep up with the other 
autocrats, who are trying to conquer his territory. Basically he has to fi nd a way 
not to kill the hen (the people and their property) that lays golden eggs (income 
received from the taxes) 
In order for autocracy to be more stable, a dynastic succession of the eldest 
son has to be established, as the principle of succession. Thus an autocrat gains a 
longer-term planning view. The problem in the autocracy is that you never know 
what kind of an autocrat will succeed his predecessor. Will he be a long-term 
planner, or a short term robber? Olson offers an interesting explanation that demo-
cracy or at least representative government appears only when there is the balance 
of power between the forces that overthrow the autocrat and neither of them is 
powerful enough to appoint himself or herself the next autocrat. Democracy in 
Olson words comes into being “by accidents of history that leave a balance of 
power among a small number of leaders, groups or families - that is, by broadly 
equal dispersion of power that makes it imprudent for any leader or group to at-
tempt to overpower the others” (ibid, p. 31). The second condition in Olson’s` opi-
nion for the spontaneous emergence of democracy is “that different forces among 
which there is a rough balance of power should not be separated in a way that 
makes mini autocracies feasible” (ibid, p. 31).  Finally, the third condition is that 
the area in which democratic arrangements are emerging is not conquered by nei-
ghbouring regimes, whether because of geographical barriers, city walls, or other 
fortunate circumstances (ibid, p. 31). 
Democracy is very conductive for economic growth for number of reasons. 
First of all in democracy there are many legitimate interests in the society, and 
there is a notion that the rule of law will be upheld. Putnam draws a sharp con-
trast between the relatively open and democratic city-states in northern Italy 
and the autocratic regime in southern Italy, derived from Norman occupation 
(Putnam, 1993). He argues that these differences permeates the history of Italy 
and has infl uenced the north-south disparity in development up to this day 
(Putnam, 1993).
33 China and India offer us a good example of this theory, because a lot of Indian families are 
still hoping to fi nd the buried treasures today, see more in  Landes, D. S.: Bogatstvo i siromaštvo 
naroda, 2003.
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5. Conclusion
Is geography crucial for economic development? Are institutions the “silver 
bullet” that answers all the questions about the economic development? In our 
opinion it is not so, but we have tried to show the importance of geography and 
institutions for economic development. Is it pure coincidence that Tuscany is one 
of the most prosperous parts of the so called “Third Italy” and one of the most pro-
sperous European regions today34? Was it luck or path dependence? As we have 
seen geography put into the motion the society building of medieval Florence and 
prevented feudalism from being formed there. Florentine institutions in medieval 
times favoured oligarchic form of Republican government and were made for 
the rule of merchants, by the merchants. Political and economic institutions of 
Florence at this time were also conductive for economic growth. Far from being 
perfect in political and economical context, these institutions enabled the birth of 
civic humanism, where individual rights (property rights being the most impor-
tant) were respected more than in neighbouring cities and regions, but the empha-
sis was put on civic community. By being the citizen of commune the individual 
was expected to act not only in his own interests but to also to act in the interests 
of commune or the wider political community. Horizontal ties were much stronger 
in Florence than vertical ones. There was great social mobility in Florence, and 
the ability of Florentine companies to cooperate in business was remarkable. The 
implication for today are that the parts of Italy that had better civic tradition like 
Tuscany of Emilia-Romagna have better local administration, better quality of life 
and better economic growth (Putnam, 1993). Horizontal ties (in economy, politi-
cs, culture etc) that sprang from the institutional system of Florentine commune, 
which in turn was the product of Florentine geography, played the most important 
part in the process of economic, but in our opinion also of human development.   
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ZEMLJOPIS, INSTITUCIJE I EKONOMSKI RAZVITAK: 
POLITIČKA EKONOMIJA FIRENCE OD XIII. DO XV. STOLJEĆA
SAŽETAK
Svrha je ovoga rada istražiti i pokušati objasniti veze između zemljopisnih osobi-
tosti, institucija i gospodarskog razvoja, na primjeru politekonomske analize Firence u 
periodu njezinog uspona od druge polovice XIII. do pred kraj XV. stoljeća. Zemljopisne 
osobitosti igraju važnu ulogu u teoriji i praksi gospodarskog razvoja upravo zbog činjenice 
da predstavljaju polaznu osnovu za razvoj političkih, ekonomskih i kulturnih specifi čnosti 
pojedinih područja. Institucionalna infrastruktura i društveni kapital također su bitni za 
razvoj gospodarstva. Stoga njihov međuodnos možemo prikazati formulom: zemljopis + 
institucije + društveni kapital = ovisnost o prijeđenom razvojnom putu.
Koristeći se povijesnom i komparativnom metodom istraživanja došli smo do 
zaključaka o ulozi i važnosti zemljopisnih osobitosti Toskane u formiranju institucionalne 
infrastrukture, oblika vladavine i gospodarskih aktivnosti u regiji. Nedvojbeno, one su pogo-
dovale stvaranju povoljne klime za gospodarsku, kulturnu i socijalnu renesansu fi rentinskog 
društva, stoga nije slučajnost što je i danas Toskana jedna od najnaprednijih talijanskih i eu-
ropskih regija. Zemljopisne osobitosti utjecale su na izgradnju društveno-političkih odnosa 
u razvoju srednjevjekovne Firence, priječeći razvitak feudalizma. Onovremene političke i 
ekonomske institucije skrojene po mjeri vladajućeg trgovačkog stališa, od strane vodećih 
fi rentinskih trgovaca, pogodovale su  ekspanziji njezine trgovine, a kasnije i bankarstva. 
Nadalje, omogućile su razvoj humanizma, pravnog sustava (osuvremenjivanje trgovačkog 
prava), te afi rmaciju ljudskih prava (osobito prava privatnog vlasništva), uvažavajući pritom 
interese šire društvene zajednice. U tome spletu geografskih, institucionalnih i socijalnih 
čimbenika leže uzroci današnje kvalitete civilnog društva, lokalne javne uprave, gospodar-
skog rasta i kvalitete života u Toskani i Emiliji-Romagni.
Ključne riječi: ekonomska geografi ja, institucije, gospodarski razvoj, srednjevjeko-
vna Firenca, regionalizam
